Abstract-Wireless communications are vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks due to their broadcast nature. To deal with their emerging challenge of physical layer security, in this paper, we study the antieavesdropping problem in the presence of selfish jammers, who desire to achieve maximum profit for themselves. We consider both the single-channel multijammer (SCMJ) model and the multichannel single-jammer (MCSJ) model. We investigate the interaction between the source that transmits secret information and friendly jammer nodes who assist the source by interfering with the eavesdropper. This problem is formulated as an oligopoly market consisting of a few firms and a buyer. By modeling the problem as a Bertrand game based on price competition, we obtain the optimal pricing scheme for the friendly, while for selfish jammers, the utility of those jammers is maximized. For the SCMJ model, we prove the existence of Bertrand Equilibrium by deriving a closed-form expression for the optimal price strategy. For the MCSJ model, a closed-form expression for power allocation is derived, based on which a new algorithm is designed to obtain the optimal strategy of the jammer. Finally, via simulations, we verify our theoretical analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION

W
ITH the development of communication technology, various types of wireless terminal devices are allowed to join and leave the system freely. Since it is easy to launch jamming attacks, the whole system is highly vulnerable and susceptible to jamming attacks. Anyone who participates in the communication can listen and possibly extract information. As security and privacy are of great importance, the physical layer security is regaining a new attention as an effective means to protect communication systems security [1] .
In effect, information theory [2] proposed by Shannon pioneered a new field of physical security. On the basis of information theory, the wiretap channel is defined by Wyner who established fundamental results of creating almost perfect secure communication system without relying on private keys [3] . Wyner showed when the main channel has better propagation condition than that of the eavesdropper channel, the source and the destination can exchange secure messages perfectly at a nonzero rate. In follow-on works, this conclusion was extended to Gaussian wiretap channel [4] and wireless fading channels [5] . However, when the condition of the main channel in wireless networks is not superior to that of the eavesdropper, the rate of secure message exchange can be very low or even approach to zero.
In the real situation, however, conditions are not always satisfied. It is possible that a certain source is unable to find an appropriate opportunity for secure transmission. To this end, the idea of jammers [6] is proposed as a feasible means to improve the level of sources' security by alleviating the malicious eavesdroppers' influence on sources [7] - [9] . In other words, by the employment of friendly jammers, the eavesdropper channel is degenerated and inferior to the main channel. In order to maximize the secrecy capacity, the power of jammers is transmitted with an exact allocation. Since the source needs to pay for the given service of jammer, the cost is also taken into account. To provide a flexible method that studies how the jammer nodes and source nodes interact and cooperate with each other for resource allocation and profit acquisition, game theory is employed.
As a powerful mathematical tool, game theory [10] - [12] is an excellent solution to model and address these problems. It can characterize some complex interactions among interdependent legitimate players. Game theory methods [6] - [9] , [13] - [16] have been intensively applied to physical layer. Some references consider main channels defending eavesdroppers with the help of friendly jammers [14] , while others [16] consider main channels defending malicious jammers to achieve large enough secrecy capacity. These systems consist of several main channels, jammers, or both.
Most of references give priority to the demand of source, but in modern communication the jammer plays an active role.
We study the communication systems in the presence of self jammers. On top of a basic configuration with a single source, a single destination, a single friendly jammer, and a single malicious eavesdropper, in this paper, two types of communication systems are established: one with multiple friendly jammers and the other with multiple source-destination channels. A pricing competition model named Bertrand game is proposed to analyze the systems. The major contributions of our work are listed as follows:
1) Most of previous works gave priority to the profit of main channel, rather than that of friendly jammers. In modern communication systems, friendly jammers probably act as mobile devices. They have no obligation to help the sources' communication and they are free to choose whether to participate in this system or not. Therefore, friendly jammers will focus the profit of themselves when they participate in the communication system and quit the system when their requirements not met. Considering this more realistic situation, we give priority to the profit of friendly jammers and propose a concept of friendly jammers with selfish character. 2) When the cost of friendly jammers is considered in previous works, it is set as either fixed or same variable value to all jammers. However, this treatment is not realistic. To this end, we propose the communication systems including selfish jammers with different costs. 3) A price competition is introduced to obtain the optimal solution when the price of each jammer or jammer's antenna is not always identical. With the price competition proposed, Bertrand game is introduced to analyze the system. In this game, jammer achieves an optimal strategy in order to maximize the profit of itself with the knowledge of the source' intelligence, while the source plays its best response with the jammer's given strategy. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to employ this Bertrand game in physical layer security such as antieavesdropping. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly describe the related works. In Section III, we introduce the system model and the Bertrand game formulation. In Section IV, we analyze the system under the singlechannel multijammer (SCMJ) model. In Section V, we study the system under the multichannel single-jammer (MCSJ) model. Simulation results are provided in Section VI and we conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Antieavesdropping Under Physical Layer
Since higher-layer techniques such as encryption [17] - [19] are complex and hard to implement, physical layer security has been extensively studied in the past decade. By exploiting the inherent characteristics of physical layer, the information can not be extracted at "bit" level by an illegal receiver.
Shannon established the information theory and analyzed security systems in communications [2] . Wyner [3] applied this concept to the discrete memoryless channel with a wiretap channel whose propagation conditions are degraded to the main channel. He determined the existence of a secrecy capacity for communication, below, which it is quite possible to obtain a complete security transmission environment. Leung-YanCheong and Hellman [4] and Gopala et al. [5] extended Wyner's conclusion to Gaussian channels and wireless fading channels. Wyner's results were extended to a weaker, named "less noisy" and "more capable" channels by Csiszár and Körner. In addition, Han et al. studied a more general case, in which public information is transmitted to both the receiver and the eavesdropper and private information is only transmitted to the receiver [16] .
As shown in [13] and [20] - [27] , the channel conditions from source to receiver are not always superior to eavesdropper. A method with an independent friendly jammer then has been proposed by the use of friendly jammer with an acceptable expense such that the interfering noise to the malicious eavesdropper can improve the secrecy capacity.
B. Analysis With Game Theory
In a variety of methods employed to analyze physical layer security, game theory is a powerful mathematical tool with unique advantages in the study of complex interactions among independent players.
Kashyap et al. [6] studied the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) Gaussian Rayleigh-fading channel. It shows that a jammer, which has access to the channel input, can cause as much damage as one without permission to the communication. Brady et al. [7] also studied the MIMO Gaussian channel. They analyzed the properties of Gaussian jamming under MIMO broadcast channels and multiple access with the employment of game theory, and an Nash Equilibrium was obtained. Tekin and Yener [8] provided an achievable secrecy rates with the help of cooperative jamming to make the eavesdropper achieve almost no information from its observation.
Different from the above studies, Zheng et al. [9] studied optimal secrecy rate in a wireless network composed of a singleantenna source, a multiantenna destination, and a multiantenna eavesdropper with the help of cooperating full-duplex jammer nodes. They proposed a new self-protection scheme for defending eavesdropping and obtaining optimal jamming covariance matrix at the destination. Credible multiple nodes can be used as secure relay or jammer for wireless network, where node either broadcasts noise as a jammer or assists in transmitting information as a relay [13] . The selection of secure relay and jammer was studied for maximizing the secrecy capacity in cooperative wireless networks. In the end, a closed-form expression was obtained about the distribution of relay and jammer selection.
Yang et al. [14] assumed a smart jammer, who can quickly adjust the transmitted power for maximizing the damaging effect after learning the transmitted power by the source. Based on this assumption, they studied a problem of optimal power control with the existence of a smart jammer. The problem was modeled as a Stackelberg game and the Stackerberg Equilibrium can be obtained by solving it. Tekin [15] investigated secrecy capacity in the presence of cooperative jammers. A sum-rate maximizing power allocation was obtained and a novel scheme called cooperative jamming was shown.
Han et al. [16] , [28] studied the interaction between the source and friendly jammers using the game theory. The friendly jammers manage the source with a price for the jamming. A Stackelberg game was investigated in [16] and the equilibrium was analyzed in [28] .
Bargaining game [33] was also used for achieving a maximum secrecy capacity with the existence of a cooperative jammer. Nash bargaining solution (NBS) was introduced as an effective method for this problem and a NBS-based scheme was achieved. Zhang et al. [34] investigated a cooperative wireless network by using a distributed auction game (DAG) and proposed auctionbased schemes for improving secrecy capacity.
In all of the previous works on antieavesdropping, game theoretic approach is adopted as an effective method for analyzing these problems. In this paper, we focus on shifting price to achieve the maximum secrecy capacity with the help of selfish friendly jammers. This approach desires to achieve greatest profit than the jammer models studied before.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we consider the communication system model with friendly jammers for antieavesdropping and programme the problem to be studied.
A. Communication System Model
We present a network consisting of a source, a destination, a malicious eavesdropper node, and a friendly jammer node. As a common scene, each node has single antenna. The malicious node tries to intercept the data, which the source node transmits to the destination node. When the wiretap channel from the source to the malicious node is an inferior version of the main channel from the source to destination, the data can be transmitted perfectly at a nonzero rate from the source to the destination. The malicious node hardly receives any messages when the source transmits the messages at a higher rate than the malicious node. The term secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum rate of secrecy information from the source to its intended destination.
Assume the transmitted power of source is P s . The channel gains from the source and from the friendly jammer to the destination are G sd and G jd , respectively. The transmitted power and the declared cost of friendly jammer are P and μ, respectively. Note that μ is the price per unit power of it. With the increase of the jamming cost μ, the jamming power P will be reduced. The channel gains from the source and from friendly jammer to the malicious node are G sm and G jm , respectively. The variance of thermal noise for channel is given as D and the bandwidth is given as W . The channel capacity of the source-destination channel is
The channel capacity of the wiretap channel is In order to ensure that the malicious eavesdropper can obtain almost nothing from the source, the data transmitted from the source to the destination are sent with the secrecy capacity as
where (·) + = max(·, 0). By quoting from [17] and [23] , we assume that the friendly jammer's interference at the destination is much smaller than the thermal noise, and thus (3) can be approximated as
(4) Under the circumstance of the properties above, two complex systems are considered in this paper: SCMJ model and MCSJ model.
SCMJ model: As shown in Fig. 1 , there are multiple jammers to interfere a single channel from source to destination in this system. Each friendly jammer i, i = 1, ..., j, transmits with power P i and cost μ i . The channel gains from friendly jammer i to the destination and the malicious node are G id and G im , respectively. We denote the set of indices {1, 2, . . . , j} by J . When the path loss model is used, we can get the channel gain by the distance to the negative power of the path loss coefficient and it is fixed. The secrecy capacity for the source-destination channel is
MCSJ model: As shown in Fig. 2 , there are single-jammer with multiple antennas to help multichannel from source to destination in this system. Each of the sources l, l = 1, . . . , , transmits message with power P s . Since the frequency division multiple access is used, the interference between different sources can be avoided. We denote the set of indices {1, 2, . . . , } by L. We assume that the jammer is equipped with antennas and each source l is only equipped with one antenna. Let P max expresses the total transmission power of the jammer and P = (P Fig. 2 . System of MCSJ model. vectors of the jammer, respectively. J is a set of jammers who is feasible if l=1 P l J ≤ P max and P = {(P
Similarly, the channel gains from the source l to the destination l and to the malicious node over channel l are denoted as G l sd and G l sm , respectively. The channel gains from the jammer to the destination l and to the malicious eavesdropper over channel l are denoted as G ld and G lm , respectively. The secrecy capacity for the source-destination channel is
B. Oligopoly Price Competition and Bertrand Game
The problem of secrecy capacity is modeled as an oligopoly market by using a competition. In economics, oligopoly is defined as the condition where only a few sellers (i.e., oligopolists) manage a special market. Under this market formation, the sellers take part in competition independently in order to achieve their target (i.e., maximize profit) by managing the performance or the price of the product in the competition. Each seller's decision affected by actions of other sellers and one firm's action can be realized by other sellers. Bertrand game is a model of price competition under an oligopoly market. In Bertrand game, the target of one seller is influenced by the other sellers' price. Therefore, we can apply the Bertrand game model to analyze and achieve the equilibrium pricing solution for a communication system consisting of sources, destinations, jammers, and eavesdroppers.
IV. ANALYZING UNDER SCMJ MODEL
In this section, we analyze the SCMJ model with Bertrand game. First, we optimize the utilities of source and jammers, respectively. Then, we prove some properties of the proposed game. Finally, we obtain a closed-form expression for the best jammer strategy. 
When C 1 > C 2 , we can differentiate (7) with respect to P i as follows:
(8) Rearranging it, we get
where
A closed-form solution is then obtained by solving (9)
where z = 4aW P s ξ/ ln 2.
We observe that P * i is a monotone decreasing function of variable μ i . The optimal P * i in low SNR region can be obtained by making comparison between P * i and the power under the boundary conditions (i.e., P i = 0 and C s = 0).
B. Friendly Jammer (Seller) Side Analysis
On the side of the friendly jammer, let U i (μ i , P i (μ i )) be the utility function of the price and the power bought by the source. Definition 2: Let δ i be the constant parameter to balance the payment μ i P i from the source and the transmission cost P i . For the jammers' (sellers') side, we define the following utility:
In this section, we will study how the optimal prices of the friendly jammers are ascertained to maximize their utility. By differentiating the utility in (11) and setting it to zero, we can get
The solution of μ * i will be a function given as
We notice that μ * i should be positive. Otherwise, the friendly jammer would play nothing.
C. Properties
From (10) and (13), we conclude that with the fixed power and price of other jammer nodes, an optimal solution (P * i (μ * i ), μ * i ) could be obtained when the jammer node takes action to interfere with the malicious eavesdropper at cost μ i . On the other hand, when other jammers' power and price are not constant, by rearranging (10), we can get
Based on the aforementioned studies and the proposed system model, we can formulate a Bertrand game as follows. In this game, the players are the friendly jammers and the strategy of each player i is the price per unit power (μ i ) that is nonnegative. The payoff of each friendly jammer i power (P i ) is the profit (i.e., U i ) gotten from the source by selling the power to it. When each of the players does not have any motivation to change its strategy, the solution of this game is obtained and is defined as Bertrand Equilibrium (BE).
Let μ = (μ 1 , μ 2 , . . . , μ j ) and P = (P 1 (μ 1 ), P 2 (μ 2 ), . . . , P j (μ i )) be the price vector and the power vector, respectively. The condition, which should be met, is obtained as follows.
Theorem 1: Given the jammer nodes' strategy μ, when U S achieves its maximum value, we have a necessary and sufficient condition for getting BE
Proof: If the maximum value of U S is achieved, (10) will be always true for ∀i ∈ J . In other words, if optimal power and price are obtained as (P * (μ * ), μ * ), we can rearrange (14) as
With μ * given, F(μ * ) should be a constant for any i ∈ J , which is true if and only if (15) holds.
We can assume that there is a μ i satisfying (10) and
, we can get F (μ i ) = 0 and F (μ j )
< 0. Then, we will get the solution with ∂ U s ∂ P j (μ j ) < 0 for any P j . Therefore, U s is a decreasing function of P j and will be maximized when P j approaches as to zero. Similarly, if
, U s will be maximized when P j approaches to i∈J P i , i.e., P i to zero. From the discussion above, we get a conclusion that for the power and price vector set (P, μ), P j (j = i, j ∈ j) will approach to zero and P i will monopolize the power demand of source from jammer nodes with (i = j). We know the system is a Bertrand game and each of the jammers desires to achieve higher profit by shifting the price per unit power of jammer nodes. Therefore, jammer j intends to lower μ j to increase its profit. It is obvious that U j J will be greater than zero when μ j is small enough to meet If the jammer nodes are noncooperative, they will be trapped in a malicious competition that every jammer scrambles to lower their price of per power. In the end, every jammer's price will approach zero and all of the jammer nodes' profit will also approach zero with the variation of price. In this situation, none of jammers can get a nonzero profit with the malicious competition.
Let us look at another situation. When a constraint of
is given, a power vector P = (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P j ) (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P j = 0) satisfying (14) always exists.
By Theorem 1, we suppose
Equations (14) and (11) become
respectively. To analyze the jammer nodes' profit, we differentiate (19) with respect to μ 0 as follows:
Theorem 2: If all of the jammer nodes would not have any motivation to change their price, the following relationship should be met:
Proof: If
, the jammer i will have motivation to change its strategy. Therefore, when each of the jammers does not change their strategy, (20) should be true for any i ∈ J . As a result, we have
By simplifying (22), we have the relationship in (21).
By rearranging (18), we have
Because of Theorem 2, we suppose
By substituting (24) into (23), we have
Consequently, there is a linear relationship between P i and P 0 and there is also a linear relationship between μ i and μ 0 . Then, we can take (17) and (24) into (11) as follows:
Differentiating (26) with respect to μ 0 and setting it to zero, we have
(27) By solving (27) , we can get the value of μ 0 as follows:
Obviously, when μ 0 = μ * 0 is met, all jammer nodes do not have any motivation to change their price per unit power and all of them get the maximum profit for themselves. In other words, they are in Bertrand Equilibrium. From (17) , (24), (25) , and (28), we can get the optimal price and power of each jammer as follows:
Our algorithm for computing optimal strategy is given as Algorithm 1 and the optimal profit of the jammer node can be formulated as follows:
V. ANALYZING UNDER MCSJ MODEL
In this section, we analyze the MCSJ model with Bertrand game.
A. Source (Buyer) Side Analysis
Definition 3: The utility function of source on channel l is defined as U l S = aW log(1 + P l s ζ l ) − log 1 + the size of source S l , we can have an appropriate assumption that
Due to (33), we can rearrange the equation as follows:
Lemma 2: U J (P, μ (P)) is continuous in P. Proof: From (32), U J (P, μ(P)) can be obtained as a continuous function. By (42), μ(P) is continuous in P. Hence, U J (P, μ(P)) is a continuous function in P.
Theorem 3: There exists P BE ∈ P such that P BE , μ P BE is a BE of the game. Proof: We know that U J (P, μ (P)) is a continuous function in P as proved in Lemma 2 and a bounded function as shown in (35). Since the set P is compact, U J (P, μ (P)) can acquire the maximum value at some point P BE ∈ P [30] . This proves the theorem.
Analyzing the definition of U J , the Hessian matrix of U J is
is not constant, and we can get a solution that the Hessian matrix is not positive definite. Thus, U l J is not a convex function and it is a challenge for computing the BE. Therefore, we propose simulated annealing (BE-SA) to get the result.
BE-SA is proposed as a probabilistic algorithm in order to approximate the global optimal value of a given function. It is used to obtain the optimal solution in a large search space within a fixed time. The convergence of simulated annealing proves in [31] . Due to the extensive usage of simulated annealing, we omit the detailed introduction of BE-SA, and refer the readers to [32] . When the number of iterations approaches to infinity, the algorithm obtains a global optimal solution with probability 1. In this algorithm, T > 0 is the initial temperature, which is high enough and the annealing parameter is expressed as ρ ∈ (0, 1), which shows the generating perturbations. At each temperature, the number of iterations to be performed is expressed as I. With P being the feasible power vector, we will obtain a perturbation P with the function neighbor(P) as:
+ for each l, where ρ l is a random number selected from [−ρ, ρ]. When l∈L P l > P max , we will set P l = P m a x P l l ∈L P l . The algorithm BE-SA will achieve the BE in the end.
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present some numerical results to evaluate the performance of our algorithm. All the simulations are performed in MATLAB r2014a.
A. Simulation Model Setup
For the SCMJ model, the source transmits messages with power of 0.2, the noise level is given as 10 −4 , the bandwidth is set as 1, the source's channel gains factor is set as 5, the gains parameter of sources a is 1, and additive white Gaussian noise channel is assumed. We show the simulation with two friendly jammers whose channel gains factor are 2 and 3, respectively. For the MCSJ model, we have ∈ [2, 10] and all of the sources transmit messages with power of 0.2. Channel gains from source First, BE-SA and mesh-based hill-climbing (MESH) [14] algorithms are considered. In the following simulation, we compare the performance of them. On this basis, we choose a better one from them to approximate the optimal solution in an acceptable running time.
Then, we compare the equilibrium of the Bertrand game with the following scenarios:
1) Sum-secrecy-capacity optimal [33] : The jammer sets its price that achieves the maximum sum-secrecy-capacity of sources. Fig. 9 . Impact of = n on source's profit.
2) Even power allocation [33] : Jammer power is evenly distributed without the channel state information and an optimal price scheme is obtained. 3) Distributed auction game (DAG) [34] : The jammer asks all sources with the same price and an optimal price is obtained with the total demands of sources satisfied.
B. Numerical Analysis
Figs. 3, 4, and 5 show the properties of the SCMJ model. The source's profit U S , the profit of jammer 1 (U 1 ), and the profit of jammer 2 (U 2 ) are shown in these figures as function of both jammers' price. We can obtain a result that source would buy service from only one of the friendly services. It is obvious that if the price friendly jammer declared is too low, the jammer's profit will become very low, and if the price friendly jammer declared is too high, the source would buy the service from the other friendly jammer. When the jammer has no profit, it has motivation to decrease its price. Fig. 6 shows the jammer's profit as a function of the jammer's price. We observe that with the rise in the jammer's price, the profit of jammer first increases and then decreases. So, there is an optimal price for achieving the maximum profit. There is an appropriate price relation between jammers, and with the relation established, an optimal price for each friendly jammer can be achieved. The jammers would always choose the one that can provide the best profit.
The following figures show the properties of the MCSJ model. Fig. 7 shows that jammer's profit U J (P, U ) is a function of the number of iterations when the parameter is fixed. Considering I, T , and ρ in Algorithm 2, there are log ρ 1 T * I = 25 000 iterations in total. It is obvious that the algorithm stops improving after 7000 iterations.
Figs. 8 and 9 compare the differences between BE-SA and MESH. Fig. 8 shows the jammer's profit U J and Fig. 9 shows the running time. We can see that the performance of MESH is better than BE-SA in jammer's profit but its running time grows exponentially with increase of the number of channels. Meanwhile, the running time of BE-SA is stable and it is related to parameters I, T , and ρ. When the number of channels is enormous, BE-SA is better than MESH. Hence, BE-SA is the recommended approach.
Figs. 10 and 11 show the impact of v i on the jammer's profit and sources' profit under MCSJ model. In this simulation, we consider there are four channels, where one is set as v i ∈ (0, 8] and the others as 2, 3, and 2.8, respectively. Note that with increase of v i , jammer's profit U J and sources' profit U S both increase. The BE-SA leads to the highest jammer's profit but not to sources' profit. When v i approaches to 3, they perform similar as the channel gains approach to each other. On the other hand, when the channel gains have large differences, BE-SA will have better performance in maximizing jammer's profit than others.
Figs. 12 and 13 show the impact of P max on the jammer's profit and sources' profit under MCSJ model. We consider four channels in system with channel gains are 2, 3, 2.4, and 2.8. Note that with the increase of P max , the profit of the jammer and sources both increase. When P max increases and approaches 1, the jammer's profit U J of them become close to each other. When P max approaches 0.03, the sources' profit U S of them behave similarly. Note that BE-SA always has the best jammer's profit and the worst sources' profit.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the anti-eavesdropping problem in the presence of selfish jammers, who have a desire to achieve maximum profit for themselves. Both SCMJ and MCSJ models have been considered. The problem has been modeled as a Bertrand game based on price competition and optimal pricing schemes for friendly jammers to maximize their utility are derived. For the SCMJ model, a closed-form expression for the optimal price solution is given and the existence of BE is proved. For the MCSJ model, we derive the relationship of price and power in a closed-form expression and propose the BE-SA algorithm that provides the optimal strategy of jammers.
